Consulting / Deployment Assurance

Physical-AI Deployment Assurance

Evidence before release for humanoid robots, embodied AI, robotics, and autonomous systems whose software decisions can become physical actions.
authority • state • control • physical consequence • stop • recovery
Scope a deployment reviewUse the deployment checklist →

The question is not “did we run a pentest?”

The useful question is whether the named system, release, or deployment has enough evidence to support its security claims—and whether the team can detect, stop, recover, and retest when those claims fail.

We model the control path from identity and operator authority to middleware, autonomy, actuation, physical consequence, and recovery. Testing follows that model rather than a generic list.

We grade reachable authority using the Physical Authority Surface (PAS), while keeping scale, consequence, safeguards, and evidence strength separate.

What we assess

Firmware and device trust

Boot, update, credentials, local interfaces, device identity, and recovery assumptions.

ROS 2 and DDS

Nodes, topics, services, discovery, namespaces, identities, policy, and command authority.

Cloud and teleoperation

Operator roles, sessions, APIs, fleet control, support paths, and remote command boundaries.

Perception and model-driven behavior

Inputs, model or policy outputs, tool and control interfaces, confidence gates, and fallback behavior.

Actuation and physical consequence

How commands become motion, which interlocks constrain them, and where independent stops exist.

Detection, stop, and recovery

Telemetry, alerts, operator intervention, safe state, rollback, incident evidence, and retest paths.

An explicit evidence ladder

A static review, simulation result, accepted command, and physical effect are different proof levels. We keep them separate.

  • Documented design or source evidence
  • Configuration and policy evidence
  • Simulation or isolated test evidence
  • Runtime reachability and command-acceptance evidence
  • Independent physical-consequence evidence when explicitly authorized
  • Detection, safe-stop, recovery, and retest evidence

How the work runs

  • Name the release, deployment, subsystem, and outcomes that must not occur.
  • Map actors, authority, state, trust boundaries, command paths, and safe-stop mechanisms.
  • Define testable invariants and the evidence needed for each deployment claim.
  • Run prioritized explorations in the safest useful environment first.
  • Record deltas, findings, missing evidence, remediation, and retest conditions.
  • Make the deployment decision with an explicit supported/unsupported/unknown boundary.

What your team receives

  • System and authority map across firmware, middleware, cloud, autonomy, and actuation
  • Explicit security invariants and the evidence required to evaluate each one
  • Prioritized scenarios tied to release or deployment decisions
  • Exploration records that separate observation, inference, hypothesis, and missing evidence
  • Validated findings with impact boundaries and reproducible evidence
  • Remediation, safe-stop, recovery, and retest map
  • Leadership readout that states what is supported, what remains unknown, and what blocks deployment

Good fit and honest boundaries

Good fit

  • A named release or deployment needs a defensible security decision.
  • The real boundary crosses robot, middleware, cloud, model, operator, and physical control.
  • The team needs reusable artifacts rather than a one-time report.

We do not claim

  • Complete vulnerability coverage or guaranteed safety.
  • Physical consequence from simulation alone.
  • Certification, regulatory approval, or endorsement by a platform vendor.

FAQ

It can include adversarial testing, but the engagement is organized around the deployment decision: authority, state, control, physical consequence, detection, stop, recovery, and the evidence needed to support each claim.
Not for every phase. Architecture, source, configuration, simulation, and isolated runtime work can establish useful evidence first. Physical-consequence testing is a separate, explicitly authorized step with its own safety boundary.
No. We report the scoped evidence, tested conditions, remaining unknowns, and decision implications. Security assurance does not replace the product's safety engineering or certification obligations.
Yes. A named release, deployment, subsystem, or change gives the work a concrete decision boundary and makes the evidence and retest plan more useful.
Yes. We work with the party responsible for the deployment decision: OEMs validating a named release, integrators responsible for the robot-to-environment boundary, and organizations receiving robots into their facilities. We scope the review around the paths that party can control, from firmware, updates, identity, and fleet management to command, actuation, monitoring, stop, and recovery.
Scope a deployment review